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Should the United States do more to
increase its workers’ skills? Many say it
should, arguing that subsidized training
helps countries maintain flexible, pro-
ductive workforces in the face of techno-
logical change and global competition.
As Commerce Secretary William Daley
has noted, “We must ensure our nation
has a highly trained workforce to capture
the vast potential of information tech-
nologies.”1  Industry trade organizations
bolster this position by claiming that
labor shortages in high-tech industries
are critical.
This apparent shortcoming has led the
Clinton Administration to propose sev-
eral initiatives. The 1997 Balanced Bud-
get Act established the HOPE scholar-
ship fund, giving most working families
a tuition tax credit of up to $1,500 per
student for postsecondary education and
training. Its purpose is to give workers
an opportunity to develop new skills
and to retrain.
President Clinton has also proposed cre-
ating the “best information technology
workforce in the world” by financing
computer-related and retraining pro-
grams to meet the “exponentially in-
creasing demand for information tech-
nology experts.”2  He also hopes to
increase education by continuing to
exclude from income the value of
employer-provided educational benefits
through the year 2000 and by providing
a new tax credit for small firms that give
such assistance. But is the present level
of training really insufficient? 
n n   Investment and Training
It’s hard to say whether there is already
enough training, since the answer
depends on how much future benefit
more training is likely to yield. For ex-
ample, if it costs $100 to give a worker
training that improves his productivity by
$10 each year thereafter, then the rate of
return to training is about 10 percent.3  If
the firm’s cost of borrowing is less than
10 percent, then it should provide train-
ing, since only part of the training pro-
ceeds will go to pay off the $100 loan. 
A rate of return higher than the cost of
borrowing is a sign that training may be
underprovided. Unfortunately, actual
rates of return are hard to obtain because
they depend on estimates of training
costs and benefits. Expenditures on for-
mal training, which is believed to yield
the greatest benefits in terms of higher
productivity, ranged from $30 to $55 bil-
lion in 1989.4  Estimates of the rate of
return for formal training were more pre-
cise, ranging from 16 to 36 percent
annually.5
Estimated returns at both ends of this
range substantially exceed the cost of
borrowing, which suggests that the train-
ing level is inadequate. These estimates
assume that workers remain with the
same employer, but what about those
who don’t? If the skills they are taught
are not firm-specific but portable across
firms, then workers who leave right after
they finish training would produce a
zero rate of return for the firm. Accord-
ingly, these estimates are meaningful
only if a worker’s increased productivity
is the same whether he remains with the
firm or transfers to another.6
Human capital theory separates worker
education and training into two broad
categories: firm-specific and general.
General training can be applied to a wide
variety of jobs and industries, but firm-
specific skills cannot. If half the work-
force leaves after firm-specific training,
then the actual rate of return is half the
estimated one. The impossibility of dis-
tinguishing clearly between firm-spe-
cific and general training makes calcu-
lating the rate of return even more
problematic.
This Economic Commentary takes a
different route, examining whether eco-
nomic theory’s projections about the op-
timal training level are in obvious dis-
agreement with the facts. The answer
boils down to whether firms’ incentives
to train workers align with the social
costs and benefits.
They certainly wouldn’t align if training
yielded benefits not captured by the firm.
For example, society subsidizes general
education, partly because of its alleged
externalities. In other words, although a
person gains from receiving an educa-
tion, society also gains if that person
becomes a “better citizen” in the process.
Are similar externalities associated with
on-the-job training? It may be a stretch to
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but it almost certainly creates a more pro-
ductive worker. On-the-job training dif-
fers from general education in that its
benefits are internal to the firm and di-
rectly influence its decision to train
workers. Thus, with all the benefits inter-
nalized, neither under- nor overinvest-
ment in training will necessarily follow.
n n    Firm Size, Turnover, 
and Training
Many believe labor mobility keeps firms
from providing enough training. After
all, firms cannot recoup training costs if
workers change jobs (see table 1). This
perceived problem is particularly acute
for high-turnover firms, which spent 7.6
hours per employee providing formal
training over a recent six-month period
versus 27.4 hours for low-turnover
firms.7 The difference is remarkable
given that, on average, new hires need
extensive training—6.1 hours in the first
month and 21 weeks to train fully. This
difference is even greater in small firms
(50–99 employees), which tend to have
higher turnover than large ones. As a
result, small firms provide less than half
as many hours of formal training as large
firms over a six-month period: 5.7 hours
compared to 12.1 hours.
The fear that high-turnover firms train
too little has prompted many countries
to subsidize worker training in such
businesses. (Japan, for example, pays
half the cost of hiring teachers and pur-
chasing course materials for small
firms.) Although high-turnover firms
provide less training overall, it is un-
clear whether this amount is socially
inefficient. To decide if additional train-
ing would be beneficial, it is therefore
important to understand whether a
firm’s incentive to train aligns with soci-
ety’s. The answer depends on the rela-
tionship between wages and training.
According to basic economic theory,
competition guarantees that a worker
will be paid the value of his marginal
productivity—that is, the amount pro-
duced in the last hour worked. This
means that during training, a worker’s
wage will equal his marginal produc-
tivity less the training costs. When a
worker’s wage is reduced by the costs of
training, he is said to be paying for train-
ing costs. If a worker’s wage does not
fall by the amount of these costs, then
the employer is paying at least some of
them. But to say that “a firm pays for the
costs of training” is inaccurate. Initially
it may, but over time workers pay back
the “loans” by earning less than their
marginal productivity.
Because general training is portable,
workers must pay for it; otherwise they
could quit without repaying the firm for
the implicit loan. After all, the increased
productivity and wages due to general
training would also occur in alternative
jobs. If workers did indeed pay for their
training, then they would effectively de-
cide whether—and how much—train-
ing they receive; the firm would be in-
different to providing general training. 
A worker’s desire for training would de-
pend on its costs compared to its future
benefits, and there is no reason to sus-
pect that the amount of training would
not be socially efficient. There also
should be no relationship between turn-
over and training. 
Unlike general training, firm-specific
skills are not easily transferred across
firms. Because a worker’s productivity in
his current job is greater than it would be
elsewhere, competition no longer guaran-
tees that employees will pay training
costs. In fact, because workers prefer a
constant wage to one that varies over
time, employers will tend to pay for firm-
specific training. That is, workers take out
implicit loans from firms, which they
repay in terms of lower wages while they
work there. If loan markets were perfect,
these loans would be made through
banks, and workers would still choose the
optimal amount of training. Financing the
loans through firms rather than banks
does not change this basic equation.8  The
employer bears the training cost, while
the benefits to the firm (by way of
implicit loan repayments) and to society
(by way of increased productivity) accrue
as long as the worker remains with the
firm. Although high-turnover businesses
will provide less firm-specific training for
their employees, this is efficient because
the productivity benefits to employees
cease once they leave.9  It also explains
why high-turnover firms give their work-
ers less training.




Professional and technical 30.9 27.7
Computer procedures,  programming, 
and software 38.4 54.3
Clerical and administrative support 18.7 30.1
Sales and customer relations 26.6 30.9
Service related 12.5 14.7




Occupational safety 58.0 47.7
Communications, employee  
development, and quality training 40.2 32.6
Other 3.4 0.8
NOTE: Workers in firms employing 50 or more, surveyed May–October 1995.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1995 Survey of
Employer-Provided Training, USDL 96–515, December 1996.
Hours of training  
Total Formal Informal
Establishment size
50–99 workers 40.1 8.2 31.9
100–499 workers 48.0 13.5 34.5
500 or more workers 42.6 16.6 26.0 
Turnover rate
Low 46.3 27.3 19.0
Medium 45.9 15.6 30.4
High 41.8 7.6 34.2
TABLE 2 WORKERS WHO RECEIVED TRAINING FROM
CURRENT EMPLOYER
(Percent)So far, our analysis has found no reason
to believe that training is suboptimal,
but this conclusion depends heavily on
economic theory and its predictions.
Studies indicate that employers tend to
pay for firm-specific training. Contrary
to theory, however, they typically pick
up the costs of general training as well,
since jobs with large initial general
training requirements do not have lower
starting wages.10  If they are indeed
helping to pay for general training, then
the amount of training provided by
firms—particularly high-turnover
ones—may be suboptimal. This is
because firms reap the benefits of train-
ing only while the worker is employed
there, but benefits for the worker and
society continue after separation.11
While the amount of general training
may be insufficient, human capital the-
ory and supporting data suggest that
firm-specific training is probably being
optimally provided. So, should society
provide blanket training subsidies? The
problem is that doing so would encour-
age both types of training, particularly
an excess of firm-specific training. 
One alternative is to support only gen-
eral instruction, but its distinction from
firm-specific training is often unclear.
Therefore, even the conclusion that
firms are paying for part of general train-
ing may be suspect. Economists often
assume that training conducted on com-
pany premises is firm-specific, while
company-sponsored training delivered
outside the work environment is general.
This distinction is somewhat arbitrary, as
is that between general and firm-specific
training. Most training is probably a
mixture of the two.
We go on to examine the argument that
training subsidies are necessary in a
society undergoing rapid technological
change which requires up-to-date skill
levels. Technological change is often
cited as a reason for training levels’
inadequacy, which is essentially the
Clinton administration’s view. To ana-
lyze it, we assume that all other training
is being optimally provided.
n n    Age, Technology, and Training
The Administration’s argument has it
that, without government assistance, the
U.S. workforce will lack the technical
skills to move the country forward eco-
nomically. According to this argument,
the absence of on-the-job training in an
environment of rapidly advancing tech-
nology would result in very slow im-
provement of workers’ skills, which
would be updated only as young, freshly
trained workers entered the labor mar-
ket. This view, however, assumes
implicitly that workers are not learning
new skills after they leave school.
While our data don’t show that firms fail
to provide the optimal level of techno-
logical training, they do suggest that, in
order to accommodate the demand for
new skills and technologies, formal
training is often delivered in the work-
place (see table 2). Some 38 percent of
employees received formal computer-
related training and 54 percent received
informal training during their tenure
with their current employers.12  Occupa-
tional safety was the only skill area with
a higher incidence of training, but it was
of short duration—for formal training,
only 0.6 hour per employee between
May and October 1995. At 5.1 hours,
computer training clearly dominates. 
A related argument is that computer
training is provided primarily to younger
workers, who need it the least because
they’ve been prepared by recent school-
ing. In contrast, students a generation ago
received little or no such education, and
it is argued that today’s older workers
rarely receive the computer instruction
they need. 
The lack of data makes it hard to say how
computer training is allocated among dif-
ferent age groups. Given the importance
of computer training, however, we con-
sider instead the total amount of training
being provided to older workers, who
receive the least employer training of any
age group (figure 1). The proportion of
workers who get formal training during a
12-month period declines with age—
from 79 percent of those aged 25–34 to
just 51 percent of those 55 and older. The
only exception is for workers under 25,
who get less training than their slightly
older counterparts.
These data fuel the argument that older
workers seldom receive the training they
need to update their skills, a conviction
shared by many throughout the world.
Japan is among the countries that pro-
vide subsidies to encourage firms to
train workers over 45.13
The lower training level for older work-
ers may seem inconsistent with the
notion that most training results from
technological change. It is, however,
consistent with human capital theory,
which suggests that younger workers
invest more heavily in general education
and training early in their careers, to
maximize the time available for enjoy-
ing the benefits. However, additional
training and education are needed as a
worker’s skills depreciate over time.
n n    Conclusion
One of the most important questions
about employer-provided training is
whether government should subsidize it.
The issue is especially germane in light
of the increasing demand for highly
skilled workers, the aging of the popula-
tion, and recent proposals urging
government involvement.
Unfortunately, without supporting evi-
dence it is hard to say conclusively
whether the optimal amount of training is
being provided. Economic theory sug-
gests that the usual arguments for subsi-
dies do not apply, but opponents argue
that this theory may not be correct. Plain-
ly, more work—especially empirical
work—needs to be done, but where does
this leave policymakers? Without clear
evidence, the answer depends largely on
faith in economic theory. Had we started
by assuming that more training is neces-
sary, we would not have done much to
change anyone’s opinion. Having taken a
purely agnostic approach, however, our
best (though imperfect) guess is that
training is being optimally provided.
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FIGURE 1 FORMAL JOB
TRAINING
a. In the 12 months prior to the survey.
b. May–October 1995.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor,
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6.  Another problem is that estimated rates of
return apply to a group of workers. The ques-
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place depends on the rate of return for the next
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are the ones likely to have the highest produc-
tivity gains, this rate of return is likely to be
substantially less than the estimated one.
7.  Unless otherwise noted, the data we cite are
based on U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 1995 Survey of Employer-
Provided Training, USDL 96–515. Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, December 1996. This sur-
vey of establishments with 50 or more work-
ers was conducted from May to October 1995.
8.  The statement that training is optimally
provided is for a given amount of turnover.
Since there is an excess of turnover, more
training would be optimal only if turnover
decreased. Training subsidies, however,
would have little effect on turnover.
9.  The firm can pay the entire training cost 
if the worker’s wage (his productivity after
training minus the “loan payback”) exceeds
his productivity if he changed jobs.
10. See Jonathan R. Veum, “Training,
Wages, and the Human Capital Model,”
National Longitudinal Surveys Discussion
Paper, Report No. NLS 96–31. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, November, 1995.
11. Workers naturally would prefer even
more training if the employer paid all costs.
However, when they share costs, the firm and
the worker must agree on whether the train-
ing should be provided. Because firms are
paying some of the costs and may not enjoy
the benefits, less training would be provided
than if workers paid all of the costs. Of
course, workers would have an incentive to
bribe firms to allow such training, that is, to
pay for the training themselves. Why this
does not occur is unclear. Without under-
standing these reasons, we should be cau-
tious in concluding that too little general
training is being provided. 
12.  We concentrated on computer training
because data on broader definitions of techni-
cal training are not available.
13.  See footnote 4.
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